Tag Archives: Investing

Nikkei Downtrend (1982-Present)

click for ginormous chart
Nikkei 20 years
Source: Kimble Charting

Source: The Big Picture

Random Thoughts, Comebacks, Intraday Reversals and the like

Since it is a Friday before a 3 day holiday weekend, its a good time to kick back, thinking about what the recent market action might mean.

• Most Day-to-day market action is noise, There is very little signal involved, with the vast majority of commentary after-the-fact rationalizations of what just occurred.

• Over the years, one of the few exceptions that I have found is the IntraDay reversal. After a long move in either direction, followed by a big flip can be worrisome.

• I do pay attention to days like Wednesday that start out strong and end weak. The caveat: All bets are off on FOMC minute days, as we seem to have a big spike in volatility (someone must have done a study on this).

• Consider a day that starts out 150 Dow points up (or down) and ending the day down (or up) 150. That 300 point swing is more significant than a down (up) 300 point day. We sometimes see it at major tops and bottoms, as it reflects an exhaustion of one side in the battle of supply and demand. (Candlestick technicians have the data on shooting stars and dojis; if this interest you see Steve Nison’s book Japanese Candlestick Charting Techniques).

• Of course, all of this can reflects your biases, holdings, fears and worries. That is why I try to think about issues such abstractly, and referencing current positions. Otherwise, we encounter the problem that markets can serve as Rorschach tests, reflecting peoples pre-existing investment postures, not what they truly think.

Bears see the intraday reversal such as Wednesday as a very significant change in tone; Bulls see a comeback such as Thursday as proof of a Japanese overreaction to weak China economic news, that was not applicable to the US.

• Lately, it seems that markets close the day much stronger than the early morning futures would imply. I’d love to see the actual data on that (Closes vs AM Futures). It is similar to what used to be called the Smart Money Index, something created by Don Hays. (I have no clue if SMI has any insight).

• My key takeaway is that the cognitive bias is immense. Most of the attempts we see to interpret short or even intermediate term market action are often overwhelmingly filled with rationalizations of existing positions.

• So much of what we have learned from the data is counter-intuitive. The most challenging thing confronting the vast majority of investors is their inability to make objective, emotion-free decisions based on empirical data. Instincts, hunches and emotions are killers when it comes to the markets.

Source: The Big Picture

GMAMX: Goldman Sach’s Muppet Fund of Funds

In our day job, we have a Fiduciary relationship with our clients. A Fiduciary has a legal obligation where all actions are performed for the benefit of the client. It is a much higher standard than the typical “Suitability” standard, which essentially says you cannot sell Facebook IPO shares to grandma. We sit on the same side of the table as our investors, as opposed to adversaries looking to “monetize” clients.

So you can imagine our amusement when the prospectus for this fund made its way to our attention yesterday:

Goldman Sachs Multi-Manager Alternatives Fund (GMAMX)

According to a prospectus, the fund gives investors “exposure to common trading strategies of hedge funds including long-short-equity, event driven investments, relative value trading and opportunistic credit trading.”

It is a mutual fund of hedge funds, with all the layers of fees costs and taxes you might imagine.

According to the prospectus, the managers of the fund have already selected a number of hedge funds — Ares Capital Management, Brigade Capital Management, GAM International Management, Karsch Capital Management and Lateef Investment Management as the initial run of hedgie managers.

Note that the “Costs to execute those strategies will be borne by the fund’s investors.” These costs are include fees, plus the use of leverage, derivatives and (up to 15%) illiquid investments. (Sounds awesome).

Annual fees for the fund may reach as high at 3.3% for some classes of shares — not counting the A shares, which start off with a 5.5% upfront fee.

Source: The Big Picture

What Is Your Market Context?

What year is it?

That seems to be one of the themes that keeps popping up lately. What year is 2013 like? Is it 1999 and we are about to crash? Is it 1982 and we are on the verge of a multi-decade bull run? Or are we heading for a 1987-like debacle?

The answer is none of the above. The circumstances today do not have any exact parallel to prior years or cycles. A quote often attributed to Mark Twain* is that “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” My favorite rhyme this cycle has been 1973-74. I have referenced that repeatedly during and after the 2008-09 crash. To me, the 56% fall and ~74% snapback rally was hard to argue against as the closest historical analogy.

That is, until ZIRP and QE1-4 began. An FOMC engineered 145% rally off of the lows at a 0% Federal Funds rate is simply a case of first impression. There are no historical analogies to the current circumstances. The Fed action has shifted the context debate into a new dimension.

Now before you go accusing me of saying that phrase, a brief word: Many people seem to misunderstand the context of Sir John Templeton’s famous quote: “The four most expensive words in the English language are “this time it’s different.” I have always interpreted that to refer to the fact that since human nature is unchanging, it is never different this time. But this truism does not mean we should not discern different circumstances that drive investors at different parts of the markets cycle. Facts can and do differ. That has major repercussions — at least over the short-to medium term.

How might the Fed engineering of the post-credit crisis recovery manifest itself? I can imagine three possibilities:

1) Stopping the natural recessions and corrections;

2) Skipping the last 5 years of the secular bear market (Its 1982!)

3) Driving us straight to 1987

Let’s briefly consider each of these.

What does it mean that the Fed has stopped the natural recessions and correction cycles? Here we are are, almost five years post the last recession start — and the economy continues its modest recovery. This is what Reinhart & Rogoff paper — the good one — forecast. FOMC policy is stimulating demand for anything credit-driven. This includes corporate CapEx spending, consumer auto purchases and of course Housing. I do not know of any parallels to these circumstances.

Option 2 is skipping the last 5 years of the secular bear market and fast forwarding us to 1982. Problem is, P/E ratios never quite got low enough and dividend yields never got high enough. However, the credible counter argument is simply low rates removed the expected competition. Without risk-free US Treasuries yielding 14%, the major competitor to equities never materialized. Hence, stocks were prevented from finding their natural floor.

The final option is that the Fed is driving us straight to the 1987 crash. Professional money managers have been forced in; dividend stocks are the new treasuries. Even mom & pop are starting to look at the stock market. The flip side of this is that after nearly 40 months of outflows from equity funds, we now have but 5 consecutive months of modest (at best) inflows. Bond funds are still attracting more dollars.

~~~

There are lots of other factors affecting markets: Taxes are low, Asia’s development, contained labor costs, international market expansion, productivity gains, practically free credit. Hence, why I say there are no direct paralleles to the current circumstances in the market’s history books.

You Humans are the same as you have ever been. Your cognitive biases and emotional (over)reactions are no different than they have ever been. But the circumstances in which you make risk/reward decisions, the context of your investing analyses, are vastly different than what we have become accustomed to.

I suspect this change of context may surprise all of us . . .

Source: The Big Picture

De-equitization Juicing Market Gains

Click to enlarge
Chart

Source: The Big Picture

Gundlach of DoubleLine Goes Prime Time

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Video

Source: Hedgeworld


Source: The Big Picture

Inker: Explaining Equity Returns

Several comments in yesterday morning’s post sent me back to GMO’s archive to pull some of Ben Inker’s work.

You should read yesterday morn’s commentary (here), than come back and read Inker. In particular, his piece Explaining Equity Returns.

The five takeaways are as follows:

1) GDP growth and stock market returns do not have any particularly obvious relationship, either empirically or in theory.

2) Stock market returns can be significantly higher than GDP growth in perpetuity without leading to any economic absurdities.

3) The most plausible reason to expect a substantial equity risk premium going forward is the extremely inconvenient times that equity markets tend to lose investors’ money.

4) The only time it is rational to expect that equities will give their long-term risk premium is when the pricing of the stock market gives enough cash flow to shareholders to fund that return.

5) Disappointing returns from equity markets over a period of time should not be viewed as a signal of the “death of equities.” Such losses are necessary for overpriced equity markets to revert to sustainable levels, and are therefore a necessary condition for the long-term return to equities to be stable.

Interesting stuff — worth exploring in greater depth . . .

Source: The Big Picture

Habits of the Bear, Bull Markets and Agency Issues

Source: The Big Picture

Equity Risk Premium is High (this is bullish)

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Source: The Big Picture

Appaloosa’s Tepper Bullish on Stocks (Still)

click for Video
tepper
Source: CNBC


Source: The Big Picture